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Abstract 
 
The main question we address is whether the weak FDI level in the SEE-7 is 
linked  to  ill-adapted  institutions  or  not.  In  order  to  answer  it,  we  need  to 
understand the role of institutions in shaping a strong localization advantage for 
FDI.  We  develop  a  theoretical  framework  to  understand  the  relationship 
between Transition, Institutions and inward FDI. We assume that the ability to 
attract  FDI  depends  on  the  local  institutional  arrangement.  We  present  our 
pattern of institutional arrangement that may help us understand why, in spite of 
identical institutions, countries attract a different level of FDI. We split the SEE 
into two categories of host countries, each category being characterized by a 
specific  institutional  arrangement  and  level  of  FDI.  We  conclude  with  the 
relevance of our proposition to develop an analytical framework where FDI is 
the outcome of a new and well-adapted institutional arrangement. 
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1. Introduction 
After fifteen years of transition, institutions, mainly market and political 
ones, appear to be a strong foundation for a rapid but irreversible shift from 
socialism  to  market-oriented  economy  (Johnson,  Kaufmann,  Shleifer,  1997; 
Nagy,  2002).  However,  the  economic  performances  of  transitional  countries, 
with  regard  to  growth  and  inward  FDI,  are  unequal  so  that  the  quality  of 
domestic institutions, and more and more their flexibility and credibility, have 
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emerged as a relevant subject of interest (Daude, Stein, 2007; Fabry, Zeghni, 
2009; Rodrik, Subramanian, 2003).  
Institutions
1 are a local arrangement of conventions and rules embedded in 
a historical, cultural and geographical context. They are an endogenous element 
of a country‟s economic growth and attractiveness of FDI. The aim of this paper 
is to analyse the link between inward FDI and the institutional arrangement set 
up  in  seven  countries  (Albania,  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, 
Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia) in the South East of Europe
2 (SEE-7). FDI in 
SEE-7 is concentrated at 81, 3% in three countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, and 
Romania) and the SEE-7 receives 30,2% of the total inward-FDI in the transition 
countries (EBRD, 2009). 
Ethnic origins, religion and culture, combined with the communist legacy, 
make these countries singular. First, they are latecomers in term of FDI hosting 
because the collapse of communism created windows of opportunities for ethnic 
and  religious  communities  but  not  for  FDI.  The  splitting  of  the  Yugoslav 
Republic into Bosnia & Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, FYR of Macedonia, 
Serbia, and Montenegro was a consequence of internal conflicts and civil wars 
(Broadman et al., 2004). These „new‟ but heterogeneous micro- countries are not 
naturally attractive for FDI because they have small market size and they lack 
intra-regional  integration  and  intangible  resources.  Second,  except  Bulgaria, 
Romania,  Croatia  and  the  FYR  of  Macedonia  who  were  guided  by  the 
Copenhagen criteria
3, the SEE have to set up major reforms. New institutions 
need to be introduced and former institutions to be reshaped to support a market-
oriented economy and also democracy. The task is difficult in comparison with 
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interaction” including formal institutions (law and regulation) and informal ones (convention). 
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2 FIAS (2007) consider as SEE the seven countries we selected and the Republic of Moldova. We 
excluded the Republic of Moldova because it did not  receive a consistent amount of inward-FDI 
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3 Before accession, Bulgaria and Romania had to fulfil the three main Copenhagen criteria: the 
political criterion (stability of institutions, the level of democracy, the rule of law, human rights 
and  the  respect  for  and  protection  of  minorities),  the  economic  criterion  (efficient  market 
economy,  capacity  to  cope  with  competitive  pressure  and  market  forces  within  the  European 
Union), the Acquis Communautaire criterion (the ability to take on the obligations of membership 
including adherence to the aims of the Political, Economic and Monetary Union). Croatia and the 
FYR of Macedonia have been candidate countries since 2005. On the 25
th of October 2010 the 
European Commission President made it clear that Croatia's accession talks to join the EU may be 
completed  by  the  end  of  2011  rather  than  in  the  spring,  as  initially  targeted  by  the  Croatian 
Government. The European Commission President referred to chapter 23 of Croatia's accession 
negotiations on fighting corruption as a key test for the country's accession. He said that whilst 
important progress had been made, more concrete reforms were needed. The negotiation process 
of Croatia was interrupted in 2008 over a border dispute with Slovenia, which was resolved by 
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the high rate of poverty and the war disasters that damaged political stability, the 
infrastructure  reliabilities,  the  industrial  structures,  and  affects  the  foreign 
investors‟  perception  of  risks.  Among  countries  not  devastated  by  ethnic 
conflicts,  the  level  of  corruption,  the  lack  of  entrepreneurship  mood  and 
capabilities, the weaknesses of the industrial structures also deter inward-FDI 
(Gray, Hellman, Ryterman, 2004) so that most of the SEE-7 is at the periphery 
of the EU from a geographical point of view but also from an economic and 
social one
4. Finally, the SEE-7 has to deal with  the challenge of globalization. 
All countries, whatever their development level and historical background, have 
to  host  inward-FDI  to  stay  competitive.  In  the  specific  case  of  transitional 
countries, FDI may help to upgrade the industry, enhance foreign technologies 
absorptive capacities and promote international trade (Gosh, Wang, 2009; Fabry, 
Zeghni 2003). 
As  shortly  described,  the  actual  institutional  context  is  a  barrier  to 
attractiveness and development. The main question we address in this paper is 
whether the weak inward-FDI level is linked to ill-adapted institutions or not. In 
order to answer it, we need to understand the role of institutions in shaping a 
strong localization advantage for FDI. The quest of reliable and safe institutions 
has  emerged  in  the  economic  literature  as  a  catalyst  for  growth
5  and as an 
inward-FDI  attractor  (Pournarakis, Varsa kelis,  2004;  Bevan,  Estrin,  Meyer, 
2004; Bevan, Estrin, 2004). But questions are still arising about institutional 
arrangement as FDI attractor in transition. According to Rodrik (2004), each 
development level generates a specific institutional arrangement . A logical 
prolongation consists in establishing institutional pattern in order to understand 
the trajectories of these countries as well as their attractiveness (Berthelier et al., 
2003). We assume that the ability to attract inward FDI depends on the lo cal 
institutional arrangement.  
This paper aims to understand the relationship between Transition, 
Institutions and inward FDI. It is structured as follows: first of all we discuss the 
link  “Institutions  and  FDI”  and  consider  Institutions  as  FDI  attractors 
particularly in a transitional context. Secondly we will focus on the measurement 
of institutions and explain why the quality of institutions is a derivate from the 
quality of governance. Then we propose a pattern of institutional arrangement 
that  may  help  us  understand  why,  in  spite  of identical  institutions,  countries 
attract a different level of FDI. Finally, we conclude with the relevance of our 
proposition to develop an analytical framework where inward FDI is the final 
outcome of a new and well-adapted institutional arrangement. 
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2. Institutions as FDI attractor 
The relationship between institutions and FDI may have to gain from the 
literature devoted to the link “institutions and growth”. Authors that have studied 
the relationship between institutions and growth stressed that good institutions 
stimulate  growth  and  development  rather  than  the  contrary
6. Kaufmann and 
Kraay (2003) noticed that the quality of institutions has an impact on growth but 
the reverse influence depends on the democratisation process and on the public 
governance. Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002, 2005) show that the quality of 
institutions has a more important effect on the long -term growth than on the 
short term one. Authors like Edison (2003) or Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) 
pointed  out that a successful transfer of market institutions depends on path 
dependence and local abilities to make them effective within a local institutional 
arrangement.  
As  we  mentioned  elsewhere  (Fabry,  Zeghni,  2009),  institutions  are 
considered globally. They need to be split in different categories in order to take 
into account the  communist past dependency (Fabry, Zeghni, 2006; Zweynert, 
Goldschmidt, 2005) that makes some institutions sticky and ill adapted.  
 
2.1. Institutions, FDI and the localization advantage 
As first developed by Dunning (1993), to invest abroad, a firm needs to 
gather simultaneously an ownership advantage, a localization advantage and an 
internalisation advantage (OLI framework). Since the global era, the localization 
advantage gains increasingly in importance.  
This localization advantage is first based on natural assets offered by a 
country  to  foreign  investors  (see  table  1).  These  assets  may  be  declined  in 
various FDI determinants that influence the firm‟s decision to enter in vertical 
and/or horizontal FDI (Demekas et al, 2007). The ease of doing business in a 
host country depends less on natural assets than on created assets. Such assets, 
considered  a  localization  advantage,  have  been  first  developed  by  authors 
focusing  on  spillovers,  clusters  and  networks  (Barell,  Pain,  1999;  Campos, 
Kinoshita 2003).  
In transitional countries, FDI agglomeration may be explained more by 
the lack of local infrastructure, by the weakness of the local sub-contractors 
network and even by the unfavourable business environment than by positive 
externalities. This points out, that institutions are a strong part of the localization 
advantage.  
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Table 1. The localization advantage as FDI determinant 
Asset 
FDI determinants 
MNE strategy 
Aims  Explanatory variables 
Natural  Costs 
optimization 
Productivity  and  quality  of  factors 
mainly  labour  (cost  of  unskilled 
labour,  pool  of  skilled  labour), 
quality  and  reliability  of 
infrastructures,  raw  material 
endowments,  quality  of  social  and 
political  environment,  level  of 
technology.  
Supply oriented 
(vertical FDI) 
Market shares 
Domestic  market 
entry 
Growth  of  demand,  market  size, 
consumer  preferences,  per  capita 
income,  and  access  to  regional 
markets  
Demand 
oriented 
(horizontal 
FDI) 
New  sources  of 
competitiveness 
Combination  of  market  access, 
production  costs  optimization  and 
business  environment  (law  and 
regulation,  macroeconomic  stability, 
taxes,  presence  of  local  or  foreign 
competitors, distances) 
Global strategy 
(Efficiency-
seeking FDI) 
Created  Linkages effects  Spillovers, clusters, networks   Positive 
externalities 
(horizontal 
FDI) 
Institutions   Market  supporting  institutions, 
political institutions 
Source: authors 
 
The idea that institutions are not only FDI determinants but also created 
assets has been developed in the empirical literature (Narula, Dunning, 2000; 
Pournarakis, Varsakelis, 2004; Sehti et al. 2002) but we need to know more 
formally which institutions are relevant to attract FDI. This raises the question of 
the institutional pattern and governance. 
 
2.2. Institutions and governance 
Two  kinds  of  institutions  should  be  distinguished:  first,  the  formal 
institutions at the legal, economic and political level, and second, the informal 
institutions more complex to capture because rooted in the social area.  
Rodrik and Subramanian (2003) offer a functional typology of four formal 
institutions  that  helps  us  specify  what  a  good  market  oriented  institutional 
pattern could be. The Market creating institutions represent the rules of law that 
define and protect property rights and make contracts fair and reliable for all. 
Such formal institutions based on clear legislation and on an efficient and fair 
judicial system reduce transaction costs and create incentives for investment and 82   Nathalie FABRY and Sylvain ZEGHNI 
 
private  sector  development  (Bloningen,  2005).  Given  that  context  of 
transparency, the degree of corruption should be low. The next three institutions 
support the emergence of a social consensus about risks, burden and prosperity 
sharing. The Market regulating institutions help to regulate market externalities, 
imperfect  and  asymmetric  information  or  scale  economies  in  sectors  like 
transportation, telecommunication or environment. Regulation stresses on fair 
competition,  distortions  minimization,  and  enhance  privatisation  and 
deregulation.  The  Market  stabilizing  institutions  reduce  macroeconomic 
instabilities (inflation, currency rate, balanced budget, tax burden, trade policy, 
fiscal rules, banking system), prevent major political crises and contribute to the 
insertion of the countries in international trade. As Dhakal et al. (2007) noticed 
foreign  investors  are  seeking  openness  and  deregulation  particularly  if  their 
affiliates are cost minimization-oriented. 
Finally, the market legitimizing institutions support social protection and 
manage social conflicts. It can be an insurance system or a welfare system that 
protects a minima people from social dropping out. These institutions create 
favourable  socio-economic  conditions  (Insurance  system,  welfare  system, 
education, infrastructure, and business development). Political institutions are 
not  only  complementary  to  the  economic  ones  but  they  are  also  mutually 
reinforcing. For example, the transparency of the government actions contributes 
to the shaping of a stable environment for actors. Busse (2004) demonstrates that 
FDI is more sensitive to democracy when foreign firms are seeking new market 
shares development. Reversely, FDI is not democracy sensitive in the case of 
raw materials and energy exploitation.  
Informal  institutions  rely  on  culture,  mentalities,  habits,  trust,  norms, 
conventions,  codes,  networks,  and  even  on  nationalism  (acceptance  to  sell 
national  assets  to  foreigners,  Ethnic  tensions)  or  religion.  Knowles  and 
Weatherston  (2006)  noticed  that  informal  institutions,  assimilated  to  culture 
(Tabellini,  2010)  or  social  capital (Putnam  et  al.,  1993),  are fundamental  in 
explaining development and income differences. In some transitional countries, 
informal institutions play a major role (Jütting, 2003) in deterring the adoption 
of best practices and the change of habits.  
Formal institutions are introduced (imposed?) by the State in a top down 
logic while informal institutions are developed by the community, in a bottom 
up logic. Transition makes the former institutional pattern ill fitted so that a new 
institutional  pattern  needs  to  be set  up rapidly. Therefore,  the  quality  of the 
institutions becomes a key factor particularly in attracting FDI (Benassy-Qu￩r￩ 
et al. 2007).  
Recent  empirical  analyses  generally  retain  three  definitions  of  the 
“quality”  of  the  institutions:  the  quality  of  public  affairs  management,  the 
existence of laws protecting the private property and the application of these 
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al., 2009; Wernick et al., 2009). These analyses put forward various measures of 
the quality of the institutions among which we generally distinguish objective 
and subjective ones. Objective indicators try to measure indirectly the quality of 
institutions.  This  raises  the  problem  of  the  phenomenon  which  is  actually 
measured.  If we take into account the condemnation rate for corruption in a 
country,  does  the  indicator  reflect  a  high  level  of  corruption  or  the  good 
performance  of  justice?  Moreover,  these  indicators  exist  only  on  restricted 
samples and consequently limit the use of international comparisons. Subjective 
measurements are founded on appreciations and evaluations of experts or on 
evaluations  of  the  population  through  surveys  carried  out  by  international 
organizations and NGOs
7. Obviously subjective, these measures of the quality of 
institutions raise some difficulties. For example, a data survey, to apprehend 
correctly the situation, needs to rest on a broad sample, which is expensive to 
carry out. Moreover, it is not excluded that the interpretation of a question varies 
according to the country where one is located (i.e. the perception of human 
rights in France compared to China). For their part, the evaluations of experts 
generally rest on a restricted number of opinions, which poses the problem of the 
sample size and, as Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) stressed, of the 
possibility of an ideological bias. 
In spite of the fact that international organizations (Heritage foundation, 
Transparency International, World Bank, EBRD) publish data and indicators 
based on survey and experts‟ rating, international comparisons are difficult to 
draw. Consequently, the indicators must be used carefully (Bloningen, 2005). 
Measuring institutions is complex and does not make it easy to identify with 
exactitude  which  institution  is  responsible  for  the  bad/good  economic 
performances. In that context, how to draw some recommendations of economic 
policies? Last but not least, models suppose that institutions are endogenous. But 
if institutions influence the economic results of a country, economic variables 
may  reversely  influence  institutions.  This  raises  a  causality  problem  able  to 
generate a bias of simultaneity. 
As noticed by Busse et al. (2007), institution quality may be approached 
by governance defined by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008, p.7) as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This 
includes  the  process  by  which  governments  are  selected,  monitored  and 
replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that 
govern economic and social interactions among them”. Dixit (2009) considers 
that good economic governance contributes to the protection of property rights, 
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enforces  contracts  and  supports  “collective  action  to  provide  appropriate 
physical and organizational infrastructure”.  
The higher the quality of governance, the better it will influence the 
decisions  of  the  firms  to  invest  in  a  specific  country.  A  high  quality  of 
governance will, at a firm level, help to reduce transaction costs. At a country 
level, it announces that the government is committed to provide a stable business 
environment and to set up market friendly policies. It is a “positive” signal given 
to foreign firms (Benassy-Qu￩r￩ et al. 2007).  
 
3. The local institutional arrangement and FDI 
Rodrik (2004) argues that each stage of economic development implies 
different “institutional arrangements”. A catching up process may involve some 
originality in an institutional pattern, depending on each country‟s characteristics 
(Murell,  2008).  We  consider  that  a  good  institutional  arrangement  is  the 
interplay  between  a  new  set  of  formal  economic  and  political  rules  (mostly 
inspired  from  western  practices
8)  and  a  set  of  informal  institutions.  The 
compatibility (or incompatibility) between these two types of institutions may 
explain the wide variations in the impact of law and institutional reform across 
countries and hence on FDI inflows. 
 
3.1. FDI and the institution-based attractiveness 
To understand the nature of the local institutional arrangement we need to 
consider different areas of interaction such as the social structure of the country, 
the rules of the games, the play of the game, the allocation mechanism (Jütting, 
2003).  If  the  rules  are  efficient,  the  economic,  political,  legal  and  social 
interactions will create effective conditions for FDI.  
The local institutional arrangement is a recombination (Djelic and Quack 
2003)  that  includes  a  mix  of  institution  creation  (greenfield  institution)  and 
institution  reshaping  (brownfield  institution)
9  in  order  to  create  a  new 
environment for business and to help the transformation of local organisations 
and  institutions.  T he  speed  of  institutional  recombination  depends  on  the 
matching of formal institutions with informal ones. It is a protection against 
stickiness or incompatibility between imported rules and local practices.  
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The  local  institutional  arrangement  relies  on  the  articulation  between 
institutions but also on their credibility and flexibility (Zheng, 2006) so that two 
countries with identical institutions may attract different amounts of FDI.  
Having presented what we regard as an institution-based attractiveness 
for FDI, our purpose needs now an illustration. 
 
3.2. SEE-7 host countries: the leaders and the followers 
Neither institution nor institutional arrangement is optimal. Nevertheless, 
some institutional environments are more favorable to economic development 
than  others  (Berthelier  et  al.,  2003)  and  the  ability  of  institutions  to  adapt 
appears to be an advantage for a country (Brousseau, 2000). The concept of 
institutional  profile  reflects  the  idea  that,  starting  from  a  panel  of  available 
institutions,  we  can  define  a  set  of  characteristics  that  make  countries 
comparable.  
To establish this institutional profile we used the global governance index 
(WGI) developed at the World Bank. As Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi wrote 
(2008, p. 7) “we define governance broadly as the traditions and institutions by 
which authority in a country is exercised”. Considering that governance is an 
approximation of formal and informal institutions of a country, the authors split 
the governance into six dimensions all measurable by an indicator telling a level 
of governance perception. These six indicators are: Voice and accountability, 
Political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, Government effectiveness, 
Regulatory  quality,  Rule  of  Law,  and  Control  of  corruption.  Finally,  they 
construct an aggregate indicator from these six indicators. Good governance at 
each level will result in good global governance, which may be considered as a 
safe fundament for institutions building.  
Figure  1  ranks  the  SEE-7  according  to  the  quality  of  their  global 
governance.  The  global  governance  is  the  sum  of  the  averages  of  the  six 
indicators for the period 1996 – 2009 calculated for each country. Each indicator 
may vary from -2.5 to 2.5 so that their sum may vary, in theory, from -15 to + 
15.  For  the  SEE-7  the  interval  is  between  -4.2  and  1.35.  Three  countries 
(Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania) get positive global governance and may be 
considered as having a relatively good quality of institutions. Without surprise, 
the other countries have negative global governance, among them Bosnia and 
Serbia at war for a long time. The former may be considered as leaders, and the 
latter as followers (FIAS, 2007). 
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Figure 1. Country ranking according to their global governance (average 
1996-2009) 
 
Sources: Calculus from authors according to the WGI database (various issues) 
Wired at <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm> 
 
Table 2 gives more details about the institutional profile of each country 
and its evolution between 1996 and 2009. One indicator (control of corruption) 
has a negative score for the whole period and all the countries except Croatia. It 
is approximately the same for Government effectiveness and the Rule of Law. 
Only Croatia and Romania, during the period, have a shift from a negative score 
to  a  positive  one.  This  indicates  that  public  governance  in  SEE-7  is  weak 
including for new EU members. Nevertheless, Bulgaria, Croatia, and Romania 
have relatively good performances compared to the other SEE selected. Their 
scores improved during the period for almost all the criteria. 
 
Table 2. The quality of institutions (1996 VS 2009) 
 
Albania  Bosnia-Herz.  Macedonia  Serbia 
1996  2009  1996  2009  1996  2009  1996  2009 
Voice & Accountability 
Political, civil and human rights  -0,57  0,16  -0,5  -0,05  -0,04  0,13  -1,38  0,32 
Political stability no violence 
Violence, political stability, absence 
of terrorism 
-0,12  -0,07  -0,50  -0,57  -1,28  -0,65  -1,11  -0,50 
Government effectiveness 
Efficient  bureaucracy,  quality  of 
public service delivery 
-0,54  -0,20  -1,28  -0,65  -0,47  -0,14  -0,45  -0,15 
Regulatory Quality 
Market friendly policies  0,04  0,28  -0,60  -0,06  -0,07  0,32  -1,22  -0,10 
Rule of Law 
Quality  of  contract,  police  and 
justice, crime  
-0,01  -0,52  -0,02  -0,39  -0,11  -0,22  -1,00  -0,41 
Control of corruption 
Measures corrupted practices  0,05  -0,40  -0,26  -0,31  -1,07  -0,03  -1,06  -0,19 INWARD FDI IN SEVEN TRANSITIONAL COUNTRIES   87 
 
 
 
Bulgaria  Croatia  Romania 
1996  2009  1996  2009  1996  2009 
Voice & Accountability 
Political, civil and human rights  0,11  -0,34  0,18  0,56  0,18  0,46 
Political stability no violence 
Violence, political stability, absence of terrorism  -0,22  -0,10  0,39  0,60  0,39  0,40 
Government effectiveness 
Efficient  bureaucracy,  quality  of  public  service 
delivery 
-0,96  0,01  -0,82  0,64  -0,82  -0,13 
Regulatory Quality 
Market friendly policies  0,19  0,14  -0,23  0,55  -0,23  0,62 
Rule of Law 
Quality of contract, police and justice, crime   -0,04  -0,55  0,01  0,22  0,01  0,10 
Control of corruption 
Measures corrupted practices  -1,02  -1,01  -0,23  0,03  -0,23  -0,13 
Sources:  WGI database (various issues), Wired at 
<http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/resources.htm> 
 
The FIAS (2007) survey  on foreign investor‟s expectations about SEE 
attractiveness confirms that Croatia, Romania and Bulgaria are the leading host 
countries and that the other countries are lagging behind because of a lack in 
business environment stability, infrastructure reliability, and a low perspective to 
enter  the  EU.  The  survey  points  out  that  demand  is  also  an  important 
determinant of FDI in SEE. 68% of the surveyed investors are attracted by the 
market size and 61 % by the GDP growth. 
 
4. Concluding remarks 
Transition is a two-step process. First, it is a global shift towards market 
economy that may be guided by international institutions and/or the EU. Second, 
it is a specific direction taken by each country in order to articulate a panel of 
local institutions with the requirements of the market economy. In that sense, 
institutions and their combination (institutional arrangement) become the corner 
stone of growth and FDI attraction.  
We put forward two institutional profiles in the present paper. The first 
(EU members and candidate countries) reflects a profile where the institutional 
arrangement attracts FDI, as well as demand. The second (other SEE countries) 
presents a profile where institutions are considered weak. The first profile may 
expect to host FDI in a long-term perspective and gain from the presence of 
foreign  investors  through spillovers  and  knowledge transfers. The  second, to 
avoid hosting nomad FDI, needs to improve the institutional pattern towards 
more reliable and effective reforms. We can conclude on the fact that reforms 88   Nathalie FABRY and Sylvain ZEGHNI 
 
need  to  be  effective  and  perceived  as  such  by  actors.  Reform  effectiveness 
reflects the quality of the governance, which reflects the quality of institutions.  
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